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In this paper, I explore what competencies are required for a company with broad-
based, discontinuous, high-technology products. Many of the competencies the company 
must support are seemingly contradictory. Some examples include managing deliberate 
versus emergent strategy, market focus versus disruptive design, and exploration versus 
exploitation. I propose a specific organizational structure to support such paradoxical 
competencies for a company with these characteristic broad, discontinuous, high-
technology products.  
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Many products are endpoints; complete solutions that solve a specific problem in 
a specific market and require little user integration. As the market evolves, this integrated 
architecture which was initially required to meet the performance needs of the market 
gives way to a modular approach that provides different value that the integrated solution 
could not (Christensen & Raynor, 2003, pp. 151-152). This shift is identifiable in the 
measurement instrumentation and control areas where modular offerings are gaining 
popularity in, and capability to satisfy applications traditionally suited to traditional 
integrated architectures. 
This shift to modular products exposes distinct management challenges. This 
paper focuses on the challenges presented in designing products at a company with the 
following three distinguishing characteristics: (1) serves a broad set of customers in 
multiple markets with varied solutions; (2) presents an alternative product that is 
discontinuous from previous consumer solutions; and (3) develops products which 
exploit new technology capabilities.  
Instrumentation Modularization 
Traditional instrumentation approaches are primarily self-contained devices that 
perform specific functions as a single package thus termed “box instruments.” National 
Instrument’s uses Personal Computer (PC) technology to host a wide variety of I/O 
including Analog to Digital (A/D) converters and Digital Input and Output (DIO.) These 
combine to create “virtual instruments.” Key selling points of this modular approach 
include an often-lower price point, increased flexibility, and scalability of performance 




(1) NI’s modular products can be likened to components as they are often 
applicable across a wide variety of applications and markets. This diversity is apparent 
through the company statement that “no industry makes up more than 10% of revenue” 
(National Instruments, 2009).  
(2) NI’s modular approach is markedly different to the end customer than 
historical solutions. While flexible, the modular components must be integrated to create 
a complete instrument or control system. Instead of fixed user interface in buttons, knobs 
and a relatively static display, modular solutions often use a flexible virtual interface 
customized and presented on a computer monitor. The user must change behavior to 
adopt the modular solution. 
(3) Two key technology categories enable competitive modular instrumentation. 
First, PC technologies are required for both increasing processing power and increased 
bus interconnect throughput. Second, measurement technology including D/A and A/D 
converters (Digital to Analog) converters and digital transceivers enable smaller, lower 
power modular devices to provide the same performance as traditional solutions. The 
frequency (sample rate) versus resolution is a key indicator of changing technology 
capability for instrumentation. Figure 1 illustrates the improvement in “off the shelf” 
technologies while Figure 2 illustrates bus interconnect technology improvement in 





Figure 1: Frequency vs. Resolution for Modular and Traditional Products 
 




PRODUCT GROUP ANALYSIS: TIMING AND SYNCHRONIZATION 
This paper focuses on the Timing and Synchronization (T&S) product family due 
to its broad impact to other NI products and the perspective the author has as the Group 
Manager of the R&D area. As a category, Timing and Synchronization is concerned with 
the location of events in time. With possible application across NI’s portfolio and 
industries, it inherits the same prioritization challenges that NI has in making investment 
decisions. 
One example of value T&S provides is synchronizing I/O distribution across 
wider distances or with larger channel counts than possible with alternative solutions. 
This was used at Boeing for microphone I/O to build an Acoustic Holography system that 
spanned several hundred meters and allowed for full-scale tests to identify and minimize 
sources of aircraft noise. A second application is a high channel count, localized (a few 
meters) digitizer system for cancer research. And a third is the coordination of multiple 
measurement and control systems in a production plant where test instruments must 
coordinate with ejectors to precisely remove units if they are determined to be faulty. 
Each of these applications serves a different industry with a different set of products and 
performance requirements.  
T&S has widely varied requirements for precision depending on the application 
area. The precision required for synchronizing I/O generally has precision requirements 
from picoseconds (10-12) to microseconds (10-6). The control area is often less demanding 
with requirements in the millisecond (10-3) range. In total, T&S technology has 
applicability over a performance range that differs by 9 orders of magnitude. This creates 






Breadth	  and	  Communication	  
Many corporations fit into one of two models. The first is satisfying a single gap 
across multiple markets or sets of customers such as selling soda across multiple regions. 
This might even include minor variations of the base product to better meet the demands 
of the different markets. But fundamentally, the corporation creates one product to satisfy 
multiple markets. Similarly, a company might focus on satisfying a particular market so 
thoroughly that they solve a variety of problems for this market in the process.  
One of the most important investment decisions a corporation can make is what 
product to produce. Communication between those who design the product and potential 
consumers is crucial to learn and improve decision-making. In either of the previous two 
models, the organization is satisfying a one-to-many relationship where the likely 
communication path is simple aggregation to the primary area of focus (the single set of 
customers or single product/solution.) 
Some organizations extend these primitive forms to have multiple products or 
product groups servicing multiple markets. But on closer inspection, it may be a simple 
extension of the base forms where the underlying communication from those producing 
the product to those who might purchase it is still fairly straightforward. 
National Instruments’ modular products are combined to solve different problems 
across different markets. And importantly, this combination is different. Unlike an 
organization with multiple product areas serving a specific problem or specific market, 
NI products (and thus the communication channel) do not have a direct relationship to the 
end problem they solve or the market for which they solve it.  
One example is a customer seeking to perform machine condition monitoring. 




output is monitored to preemptively identify failures. These applications span multiple 
industries and primarily use a combination of DSA (Dynamic Signal Acquisition), 
multipurpose data acquisition (DAQ), and Timing and Synchronization hardware. 
Alternatively, aerospace customers like Boeing use the same DSA product over a 
different distance and without the complement of multipurpose DAQ. Lastly, these same 
boards can be used in structural applications to measure strain and vibration in civil 
applications.  
A similar multitude of uses is common across the 20+ discrete product lines at NI. 
This many-to-many relationship has no clear communication path making it 
indeterminate where learning will—or should—occur to improve decision-making.  
Timing	  and	  Synchronization:	  An	  Indirect	  Goal	  
Timing and Synchronization is usually not the end goal of a National Instruments 
customer. Instead, T&S is combined with other product offerings to increase the value of 
the system. In the Boeing example, T&S made a coherent system with over 400 channels 
across hundreds of meters possible but it never showed up in the customer’s enumerated 
goals. This additional abstraction from the problem the customer is trying to solve 
increases the difficulty in identifying possible applications of T&S to predict future value 
of alternative investment options as a decision making criteria. 
 
Customer Goal Product Requirements Implicit Timing and Sync 
Measure sound of full scale 
model 
n DSA I/O channels over m 
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Benefits of Breadth 
Despite the challenges breadth and product diversity present, many significant 
advantages are characteristic of broad firms. Notable are the increased survival rates, 
higher proclivity to disruptive innovation, easier adjustment to environmental changes 
and behavioral emphasis on growth and innovation (Mcevily, Ren, Roy, & Sorenson, 
2006). Additionally, product offering breadth offers capability to solve “odd-ball” 
applications which are either too low volume or too new to be profitably pursued by a 
fixed-function product. These benefits of breadth should be maintained. This paper’s 
hypothesis is that an organization with the three aforementioned characteristics must be 
able to balance the breadth with focus to be effective in making the right product 







The many-to-many product-to-markets structure for companies like NI makes 
identifying, understanding and communicating with the potential customer significantly 
more difficult. 
SEGMENTATION 
Segmentation is a key method to build focus towards the end customer. Through 
segmentation, the organization hopes to delineate a population in some useful way that is 
superior to looking at the population as a whole. This segmentation is then used to 
optimize product and business decisions.  
An everyday example might be surveying consumers of tea for the temperature 
they prefer. The average response might indicate that lukewarm is the temperature the 
average customer would prefer when in fact a strategy of segmentation would indicate 
that half prefer iced and half prefer hot and almost none would prefer the “average” 
(Harrington & Tjan, 2008).  
Some segmentation methods focus on customer characteristics (demographics, 
race, age, social status) of potential consumers while others seek to determine who would 
buy the same product, pay the same price or has the same “job to be done” (Christensen 
& Raynor, 2003, p. 87). 
 In the purest sense, a product directly seeks to perform the “job to be done.” 
Thus, an understanding of the possible jobs to be done provides an indicator of the 
possible set of products. Note that while the job may be common across markets, one 
must be careful to also consider the price tolerance of the different customers, which may 




MOORE’S DISCONTINUOUS INNOVATION 
Unfortunately, most segmentation methods do not consider one of the most 
important delineations for a company like NI. Moore terms Continuous Innovations for 
those that do not require customers to change behavior. Discontinuous Innovations 
however, are those that require the customer to change behavior. An everyday example 
for a customer familiar with using an existing stove is a better stove (Continuous) versus 
a microwave (Discontinuous) product.  
Continuous Innovations might have minor impediments to adoption while 
Discontinuous Innovations are likely to have significant obstacles to market adoption. 
Moore enhances the product adoption lifecycle by adding ‘cracks’ between key adoption 
events indicating key market obstacles to adoption. The most significant of these is a 
‘chasm’ between the early market and the pragmatic early majority market.  
NI products have a different value chain than alternative solutions. The customer 
plays a larger part in the integration and customization of the end solution. NI’s products 
fit Moore’s description of a Discontinuous Innovation since they require the customer to 
“change their current mode of behavior.” (Moore, Crossing the Chasm, 2006, p. 10). 









Figure 4: Illustration of Traditional vs. Virtual Instrument 
GARNERING ADOPTION FOR A DISCONTINUOUS INNOVATION 
Of Moore’s four defining characteristics of a market, perhaps the most useful 





when making a buying decision.” (Moore, Crossing the Chasm, 2006, p. 28). With 
customers across multiple industry segments, self-referencing critical mass is not a 
natural outcome for a company like NI. To achieve market penetration and maximize 
profit potential, one must plan an explicit strategy to take action for each phase of 
resistance within a set of self-referencing customers. 
The product adoption lifecycle breaks new product adoption into five distinct sets 
of customers. It outlines that adoption begins with Innovators and continues through 
Early Adopters, Early Majority, Late Majority and Laggards: each of which have 
common psychographics. To help ensure adoption, a product must consider each group’s 
needs and fulfill them. While the earliest part of the market may be the easiest to achieve, 
it comprises only a small fraction of the potential market. Capturing the market requires 
satisfying each distinct group’s needs. 
Notable	  Cracks	  in	  the	  Market	  Adoption	  Lifecycle	  
The first crack is between the innovators and early adopters. This is where a 
“technology product cannot be readily translated into a major new benefit.” A crack of 
similar scale occurs between the early and late majority where “the early majority is 
willing and able to become technologically competent, where necessary;” with the late 
majority less willing to do so. But the most formidable transition that must be overcome 
is the chasm from which Moore gives the book its name. This is where customers now 
seek “evolution not revolution” and “early adopters do not make good references for the 
early majority.” This is the most difficult transition for companies with discontinuous 
products. Successfully crossing this natural chasm requires significant focus of the seller 





Crossing	  the	  Chasm	  D-­‐Day	  Strategy	  
To cross the chasm, Moore suggests focusing on a carefully selected “beachhead” 
market and building a base of self-referencing pragmatist customers to ensure a 
successful transition across the chasm. Achieving this critical mass is crucial as it allows 
other pragmatists to fall in line to the proven solution and market leader. The beachhead 
strategy requires the entire organization prioritize to support the effort, from product 
decisions to marketing and sales alignment. The focus is at odds with the natural 
endeavor to win any sales possible; a seemingly valid one for a broad company. Instead, 
Moore argues to avoid a sales-driven strategy and with it, purposefully exclude customers 
so focus can be given to the beachhead that must be achieved.  
FOCUSING TO A FAULT: LED ASTRAY BY THE BEST CUSTOMERS  
The goal of Moore’s strategy is not necessarily to build products that are so 
pointed that they satisfy only a single market. Instead, our goal to continue building broad 
products must be augmented by prioritizing market-specific features where necessary to 
garner adoption of these discontinuous innovations. Some potential outcomes of this 
strict market focus must be considered. 
Clayton Christensen’s “The Innovator’s Dilemma” and “The Innovator’s 
Solution” provide a useful theory for investment in innovations. Christensen segments 
innovation into two main categories: Sustaining and Disruptive.  
“A Sustaining innovation targets demanding, high-end customers with better 
performance than was previously available.” (Christensen & Raynor, 2003) In short, a 
sustaining innovation fits the model most often pursued by standard business practices 
that usually seek higher margins and higher profits. It is the natural evolution of a 
business over time. In fact, it may be a direct outcome if we improve our market 




Disruptive innovations however do not bring better products to existing markets 
but instead “redefine the trajectory” of performance often appealing to either “new or 
less-demanding customers” (Christensen & Raynor, 2003, p. 34). Christensen argues that 
disruptive innovation provides more opportunity for growth through either New Market 
or Low-End disruptive opportunities. New Market opportunities create new consumption 
where previously nonconsumption was the primary option. Low-End disruption enables 
profitability at a lower price point for customers who might be overshot by the primary 
market offering.  
In both cases, the effect of leveraging a disruptive innovation is to improve the 
likelihood of success by decreasing the threat of incumbents. In New Market 
opportunities, incumbents are likely to play a minor role as they continue to serve the 
most profitable area of their existing customers. And Low-End disruption is often 
unappealing to incumbents because it offers decreased margins and profitability than the 
demanding customers. This provokes them to flee towards those sustaining up-market 
innovation rather than fight. (Christensen & Raynor, 2003) 
As a company building market focus, the apparent consideration is to build a 
capability for continually analyzing the threat of disruptive entrants lest our best clients 
lead us “…down the primrose path” (Anders, 2007). 
POTENTIAL DISRUPTION BENEFITS 
One should not only consider disruption as a threat to business. As Christensen 
outlines, disruption can also be a strategy for increasing the odds of success against an 
incumbent. In considering the National Instruments product line, clear characteristics of 




the PC-based instrumentation strategy allowed for additional customization by the end 
user at a lower price point and with inferior performance than traditional instruments.  
Despite this inferior performance on a traditional measure, the business grew from 
customers who valued other aspects of the product where modular instruments were 
superior. With increases in PC interconnect throughput, processor speeds, and converter 
components (such as D/A and A/D) available for modular instrumentation, NI has 
narrowed this traditional performance gap. Now leading traditional instrument vendors 
such as Agilent Technologies are investing in modular product divisions (Agilent 
Technologies, 2010).  
If the business can recognize disruptive opportunities and threats, it can both 
defend positions as an incumbent and grow into new areas as an entrant. 
COMPARISON OF CROSSING THE CHASM AND THE INNOVATOR’S DILEMMA 
Both the Crossing the Chasm and Innovator’s models apply directly to National 
Instruments in seeking to achieve growth versus entrenched competitors through different 
performance characteristics than historically prevalent. With a different technology 
architecture and value chain than alternatives, it is appropriate to evaluate opportunities 
where an investment might provide a disruptive position. This disruptive advantage may 
be a key attribute to improve the odds of achieving successful growth.  
Both Christensen and Moore dissect how innovations become profitable business. 
While sustaining, continuous innovations might seem the most straightforward path in 
satisfying customer’s demands, Christensen argues that seeking disruptive innovations 
provides the greater opportunity for growth. These New-Market or Low-End disruption 




Disruptive innovations—specifically New Market—come about because a new 
market of previous non-consumers redefines the value of an innovation. It must be 
considered that these disruptive innovations are likely to have discontinuous 
characteristics since previous non-consumers are likely changing behavior to adopt the 
innovation.  
Table 2 illustrates each of these concepts using an example of computers based on 
the x86 microprocessor architecture. A Continuous, Sustaining innovation would be a 
processor that increases in computing speed. This satisfies an existing market’s most 
demanding customers with an architecture that is compatible with previous designs and 
simply faster. Trying to satisfy those same demanding customers might alternatively be 
accomplished with a multi-core (multiple computing core) CPU architecture or using a 
GPU (Graphics Processing Unit); both of which require modification to the software to 
take advantage of the new architecture thus making it Discontinuous.  
Continuous, Low-End Disruptive Innovations would include lower performance 
CPU offerings that enable a lower price as well. This might be accomplished through die 
shrinks or other new technologies to decrease cost per unit. A Discontinuous alternative 
could be a new operating system like Linux (free per unit sold) enabling a lower price but 
requiring changes to the software and user’s behavior to use the different OS. 
Continuous, New Market Disruptive Innovations could include leveraging a processor 
architecture like Intel’s Atom. The Atom architecture uses the same x86 instruction set 
but is significantly lower power than previous x86 processors. This enables the same 
software and same behavior the customer is used to but in a completely new application. 
A Discontinuous alternative might be Apple’s iPhone with its ARM architecture (an 
alternative to the x86 instruction set) and completely new operating system. It requires 
























(Die shrink / cost 
per processor) 
Handheld – Atom x86 
Discontinuous Multi-Core, GPU Linux 
Apple iPhone Apps - 
ARM 
Table 2: Comparison of Moore's Discontinuous concept and Christensen's Sustaining and 
Disruptive Innovations 
NI has made the modular approach for instrumentation simpler than alternatives 
through technologies like graphical programming and configuration utilities. This ease of 
use has made it possible to bring the unique integration of these components closer to the 
domain experts. Despite these advances, the modular approach may require the customer 
to have a skill set or commit effort to integration different from that of previous solutions. 
These conditions must be analyzed on a per market basis to ensure we can achieve 
market penetration for the Discontinuous offering. 
SUMMARY OF APPLICABLE WORKS 
With broad applicability and differentiated capabilities, many of NI’s products 
garner success without focused segmentation on a per-market basis. While beneficial for 
resilience across individual industry fluctuations, this diversity dilutes customer feedback 





A completely broad perspective is non-optimal since adoption is primarily across 
many diverse early markets and is less likely to attain deeper, higher volume market 
adoption. While the initial solution might garner success broadly, it may not necessarily 
be palatable to all customers throughout a particular market due to the discontinuous 
nature of the products.  
These characteristics of NI’s products must be considered if we are to prioritize 
and maximize the ROI. If unchecked, the broad applicability across various applications 
and markets would dilute resources across different market requirements and decrease the 
odds of overcoming crossing Moore’s Chasm. Not considering the changes in customer 
behavior necessary to use the product would leave us blind to the barriers to market 
adoption that must be overcome to achieve pervasive adoption. We will leverage 
applicable models to evaluate how we might maximize ROI by focusing efforts beyond 
the broad initial market potential. 
Designing the product to allow for deeper market adoption will likely require an 
understanding of the needs of specific customer types and their specific requirements. 
But following a specific market’s needs too closely must be balanced with exploration to 
identify both areas where the business might be disrupted and where it might be 
expanded to opportunistically disrupt others and increase the odds of success. Balancing 







The competencies required for success with a broad, high-technology company 
serving multiple market segments might seem at odds with the focus needed to gain 
adoption for discontinuous innovation. Specifically, Crossing the Chasm identifies the 
need for focus to garner adoption for discontinuous innovations while The Innovator’s 
Dilemma warns of following one’s “best” customers too closely and instead recommends 
an openness to emergent, entrepreneurial opportunities at the outset with a shift to a 
deliberate strategy once a clear path forward has emerged. There are clear requirements 
to serve specific markets and garner adoption yet build broad, modular products with 
applicability across multiple domains to leverage both economies of scale and build 
diversity to weather industry-localized economic downturns.  
Suggested Capabilities Required 
MARKET LIFECYCLE FOCUS FROM INCEPTION THROUGH ADOPTION 
As described extensively above, “Crossing the Chasm” enumerates the rationale 
for a focused, D-Day strategy to garner adoption for a discontinuous innovation like NI 
products. 
DISRUPTIVE DESIGN AND CREATIVITY 
A market orientation capable of identifying disruptive opportunities and threats 
might prove the first step in managing an organization through disruptive shifts. But 
traditional methods of garnering product design feedback from the anticipated customers 
themselves is likely to pose particular challenges for organizations investing in disruptive 
or revolutionary products. Despite the difficulty, the organization must be capable of 




Customers can be limited by their expertise. Being experts in the problem doesn’t 
necessarily prepare them with the tools to design the ideal solution. Their historical 
perspective can pose what “psychologists call ‘functional fixedness—the human 
tendency to fixate on the way products or services are normally used, making people 
unable to imagine alternative functions.” Or customers may enumerate the problem in a 
way that assumes a particular solution, providing less opportunity to create a novel 
solution (Leonard, The Limitations of Listening, 2002). Christensen’s warns against 
trying to use market-sizing methods to predict something truly disruptive. And Drucker 
warns “One cannot do market research for something genuinely new. One cannot do 
market research for something that is not yet on the market” (Drucker, 2001, p. 145). 
For an organization to be capable of disruptive design, it must be able to 
challenge the status quo and generate creative solutions since disruptive capability is 
often based on an “asymmetry of perceptions” (Christensen & Raynor, 2003). This 
necessitates creativity, which “is a process of developing and expressing novel ideas that 
are likely to be useful” (Leonard & Swap, When Sparks Fly, 2005, p. 6).  
IDENTIFY AND EXECUTE BOTH DELIBERATE AND EMERGENT STRATEGY 
Strategy is often envisioned as explicit deliberation and a firm’s decisive shift of 
the organization into action. More accurately, this is Deliberate Strategy. “The deliberate 
strategy-making process is conscious and analytical.” (Christensen & Raynor, 2003, p. 
215) Where Deliberate Strategy is intentional, Emergent Strategies are “patterns or 
consistencies realized despite, or in the absence of, intentions.” (Waters & Mintzberg, 
1985) 
Deliberate strategy’s importance shouldn’t be understated. The Innovator’s 




in the first place. The second is a lack of a Deliberate Strategy, which causes firms to be 
left behind. Deliberate strategy is key to making the race up-market.  
“Research suggests that in over 90 percent of all successful new businesses, 
historically, the strategy that the founders had deliberately decided to pursue was not the 
strategy that ultimately led to the business’s success” (Christensen & Raynor, 2003, p. 
221). And Drucker reiterates, “When a new venture does succeed, more often than not it 
is in a market other than the one it was originally intended to serve, with products or 
services not quite those with which it had set out, bought in large part by customers it did 
not even think of when it started, and used for a host of purposes besides the ones for 
which the products were first designed.” To attempt success in disruption requires a 
capability for embracing and leveraging the unexpected. And instead of casting aside 
these “exceptions,” the organization must “go out and look at it carefully and as a distinct 
opportunity” (Drucker, 2001, pp. 145-147). 
Exploiting and Exploring 
Extending the concepts of ‘Deliberate’ and ‘Emergent’ Strategies, much research 
uses the unequal but similar categories of ‘exploiting’ and ‘exploring’ respectively. 
“Whereas exploitation is associated with activities such as ‘refinement, efficiency, 
selection, and implementation,’ exploration refers to notions such as ‘search, variation, 
experimentation, and discovery’ (Raisch & Birkinshaw, 2008, p. 376). Thus, while 
exploitation seeks to optimize the existing business, exploration explicitly seeks out new 
opportunities to help avoid the competency trap Christensen describes. (Raisch & 
Birkinshaw, 2008) 
“Too much exploiting drives inertia and dynamic conservatism; exploitation 




prevents gaining economies of scale or learning by doing” (Smith & Tushman, 2005). 
Thus, while the business must be capable of optimizing current business, it needs to also 





SUGGESTED ORGANIZATIONAL STRUCTURE COMPONENTS 
Design Guidelines 
The organizational recommendation begins with the guidelines used to build the 
structure. These include: 
1. The breadth business as the primary structure—the existing “stronger hand” 
2. Leverage existing product breadth to identify possible focus areas where possible 
3. Support for paradoxical thinking by designing areas of focus both in spite of, and to 
promote alternate perspectives within the structure 
4. Divergence to allow groups to focus and build needed expertise 
5. Convergence to maintain alignment, synergy and re-use 
6. Capability for bottom-up discovery 
7. Structured but adaptive 
8. Support expertise in key phases of innovation 
BREADTH: NI’S STRONGER HAND 
NI products are naturally broad. The literature leads us to identify areas of focus 
an organization needs to support. We suggest NI seek to maintain the successful breadth 
through modular business while designing a structure to support the areas of necessary 
focus. “The best strategic moves for a company are ones that supplement rather than 
complement that company's current dominant business model” (Moore, Strategy and 
Your Stronger Hand, 2005). Thus, the areas of focus should not supplant but instead, 
complement the dominant, broad business model.  
LEVERAGING BREADTH TO IDENTIFY OPPORTUNITIES FOR DEPTH 
As Moore describes in “Crossing the Chasm”, the Early Majority is the group 
whose behavior creates the wide chasm; waiting until enough peers can be referenced to 
satisfy the pragmatic group. But the early market doesn’t hold such a rigid requirement. 
Moore’s defining characteristic that a market must self-reference still holds. It is simply 




fact, as technology adoption leaders, they likely build their own self-referencing network 
across the traditional industry boundaries. An example might be building a self-
referencing network between those who use a tablet computer across any domain. 
I noted this behavior in the use of cutting-edge NI Timing and Sync products by 
customers. Through online forums, it became apparent that Radio Frequency (RF) 
customers were referencing the solution presented in a whitepaper from a Sound and 
Vibration application. These customers did not exhibit the normal separation that would 
be expected to exist between these two markets. This presents a possibility that market 
separation that prevents referencing is not static, but variable. Figure 5 graphically 
illustrates the gradual increase in market isolation, which creates barriers to referencing 
between markets. 
Additional characteristics of these users are in line with the characteristics of the 
early market. They were more technically savvy than their mainstream counterparts and 
could identify the potential benefit of the product despite its newness and lack of explicit 





Figure 5: Variable Market Isolation 
 
There are notable challenges breadth of business brings to product design 
decisions through an unfocused lens. But as we seek to build a model that selectively 
brings certain areas into focus, this initial broad applicability is a reasonable sample set to 
consider. By releasing broadly applicable products to the market, the areas of adoption 
could be a signal towards markets where a segmented, focused approach could provide 
additional product characteristics to prioritize.  
The initial cross-market referencing, technology expertise, and individual 
enumeration of the domain-specific value propositions provide a lower barrier to 
garnering adoption for a broad product. After assessing the initial successes and failures, 
the organization should be able to learn and prioritize whether a focused, beachhead 





GENIUS OF THE AND: PARADOXES AND AMBIDEXTERITY 
It may seem at odds to develop simultaneous capability for both emergent and 
deliberate strategy, market focus and broadly applicable products, and the exploration of 
new possibilities and the exploitation of old certainties. But the organizational capability 
of managing such paradoxes is gaining traction as a necessary competency. It allows a 
successful organization to benefit from seemingly contradictory but complementary 
expertise; concluding in one such instance that the “long-term survival and success 
depend on an organization’s ability to ‘engage in enough exploitation to ensure the 
organization’s current viability and to engage in enough exploration to ensure future 
viability’” (Raisch & Birkinshaw, 2008). In fact, “…organizational ambidexterity is best 
achieved by ‘building a set of processes or systems that enable and encourage individuals 
to make their own judgments about how to divide their time between conflicting demands 
for alignment and adaptability’” (Bodwell & Chermack, 2010). By building this 
consideration into the organization I seek to provide the structured alignment of each 
handedness to complement each other. 
Moore’s “stronger hand” depiction is used to describe the difficulty building 
simultaneous coexistence for transactional products on one hand and complex customer-
centric products on the other. We instead seek to leverage this building of handedness for 
different temporal goals within the same organization. These simultaneous goals are 
perhaps less at odds than Moore’s example given that “organizational ambidexterity is 
best viewed from the multiple frameworks of organizational learning, technological 
innovation, organizational adaptation, strategic management and organizational design” 




DIVERGENCE TO SUPPORT FOCUS AND BUILDING EXPERTISE 
A broad company requires specific areas of expertise. These include areas of 
technical knowledge (digital design, analog design, power supplies, software, etc.), 
marketing expertise, etc. Divergence allows areas of the organization to build focus and 
through this focus, expertise. In some cases, particular product capabilities (and thus 
product lines) necessitate building areas of expertise. Examples include power line noise 
rejection in Digital Multimeters (DMMs) and phase noise rejection in high frequency 
Radio Frequency (RF) applications. Non-development areas of expertise include building 
an expertise in a particular customer type (Defense, Academic, etc.) or application area 
(Military, Energy, etc.). 
Divergence is also required for product designs themselves. “Too much 
interlocking creates…indistinct products poorly adapted to their markets” (Brown & 
Eisenhardt, 1998, p. 60). These are not necessarily restricted to product technical 
capabilities. Other product characteristics such as price and terminology can be as 
detrimental to a product’s adoption as a technical limitation. As an example, customers in 
the Sound and Vibration space measure synchronization performance in degrees at a 
particular sample rate—e.g. to within ½ degree at 92kHz. In contrast, most other markets 
use a simple time offset—e.g. to within 15 nanoseconds. 
CONVERGENCE TO MAINTAIN ALIGNMENT, SYNERGY, CROSS-POLLINATION 
Most, if not all product designs require multiple domain experts to work together. 
This is the simple, forced coordination that naturally occurs as part of standard product 
development. But convergence must be wider than these interactions. Without careful 
consideration and design, this convergence may not occur where necessary. If too much 
interlocking can create indistinct products, additionally “too little connection among 




services, diminished ability to learn from one another, and disconnected strategies” 
(Brown & Eisenhardt, 1998, p. 60). Convergence allows for efficiencies across multiple 
product developments through re-use, the building of an aligned corporate culture and is 
key for sharing information to build competence. 
 
Figure 6: Simplified Organizational Structure 
BOTTOM-UP DISCOVERY 
NI culture has as a tenet the understanding that anyone in the organization can 
have that spark of insight that might pave the way for the next big thing. This is proven as 
“top-down knowledge inflows from persons at higher hierarchical levels than the 
manager are positively related to exploitation. Conversely, horizontal and bottom-up 
knowledge inflows from peers and persons at lower hierarchical levels are positively 
related to exploration” (Raisch & Birkinshaw, 2008). This is reflected in the current NI 
organizational structure that is relatively flat and has multiple forums for ideas from all 
ranks to bubble up and potentially gain traction.  
Unfortunately, other business processes are built around the sustaining 







standard practice of looking at top 10 customers as part of a yearly roadmap. These top 
customers often make up the short list of visits for management teams looking to satisfy 
“their best customers.” In many cases, the lower volume outliers are better indicators of 
new areas of growth but are ignored due to their relative size and/or fringe nature from 
the current core business.  
STRUCTURED BUT ADAPTIVE 
The organizational structure is a means to optimize the conversion of inputs into 
value for the customer. Over time, this formula will not hold as either demand shocks 
(shifts in tastes) or supply shocks (shifts in technology) challenge the equilibrium the 
organization has sought to optimize. In essence, the organization must be capable of 
recognizing these shocks and reorganizing as appropriate.  
The natural evolution of a business results in processes designed to decrease 
variance and maximize return along the known path. The organization seeks to optimize 
existing business and builds an affinity for decisions that have been successful in the past. 
Over time, this causes perspective to narrow. These processes and procedures influence 
both day-to-day decisions along with more formal resource allocation activities. In sum, 
this builds an inertia that makes disruption more difficult to recognize and adapt to.  
Thus, the resulting structure should be designed to shift to where the market is 
going instead of continuing too long with inertia preserving the now-stale direction. The 
concept of “Guided Evolution” presents an option for harnessing employees and other 
factors as a source of “variation” throughout a system. By building capability to sample 
and selecting from these variations, an evolution-like system is developed. This allows 




variation could be a source of insight as to how the system might need to adjust. (Lovas 
& Ghoshal, 2000) 
STRUCTURE TO SUPPORT INNOVATION EXPERTISE  
In a traditional product organizational structure, each division must grapple with 
the evolution of their customer base. A shock that might allow an initial product to be 
viable gives rise to the product area. This area seeks to overcome barriers like Moore’s 
Chasm to mainstream adoption. Over time, the same group builds to a size suitable for 
keeping up with the mainstream market’s needs. And as the market for the product begins 
to shrink, so does the size of the group since fewer new developments are needed and 
instead, the optimization becomes efficiency and maintaining the successful status quo. 
The product group supports the market throughout its entire lifecycle with an expertise in 
the product, despite the shifting needs and demands of the market as it develops. 
Harvard Business Review’s “Create Three Distinct Career Paths for Innovators” 
breaks innovation into three unique phases and instead, argues that each deserves 
building specific expertise. They dissect “innovation” into the separate tasks of 
“Discovery,” “Incubation,” and “Acceleration.” Discovery is the creation or identification 
of a possible opportunity. Incubation is the experiment of that technology and business 
concept against both the potentially uncertain technology and market to design a model 
for a new business. Acceleration is the development of the business that can stand on its 
own. The authors argue the criticality of this approach versus the product-based 
alignment since “individuals with that breadth of skill sets are extremely rare” 
(O’Connor, Corbett, & Pierantozzi, 2009). For this reason, the organizational model 
should accommodate building both expertise in sustaining (exploiting) products and 





The following organizational structure is a simplification to focus on the subject 
of product design challenges at hand. It does not include additional support functions 
outside of the scope of this thesis. It is of note that the sales force is a direct model that 
uses regional representatives with Engineering degrees.  
PRIMARY STRUCTURE: FUNCTIONAL AREAS OF EXPERTISE  
Product Organization: Broad Business with Areas of Expertise 
The product organization supports the broad, core business. It is a single 
organization comprised of both Engineering and Marketing. It has a core expertise in 
accelerating products and sustaining a product line. Figure 7 provides an illustration of 
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The first area that requires focus is the common architecture group. This area 
specializes in building designs that can be leveraged either in large volume or across 
multiple areas of the company. One method of reducing the cost of goods sold (COGS) 
this group has built a proficiency in is the design of ASICs (Application-Specific 
Integrated Circuits.) ASIC design demands building expertise both in specialized tools 
and lower risk development methods since these architectural investments are very 
expensive and widely deployed. 
Platforms 
The second area of focus is the platform group. The platform is an especially key 
component for modular hardware since it defines both the capabilities and limitations of 
every product within it. For example, the NI cRIO platform is a low power, rugged 
system designed for industrial environments whereas PXI provides significantly higher 
power, processing power and bandwidth but across a narrower mechanical and 
temperature range. The platform limits not only the overall environmental constraints but 
also what module types can be built within it and how they might be used together for 
different applications.  
 
Figure 8: NI PXI and cRIO Platforms 




The platform decision is a long-term investment that multiple groups align to. It 
involves gathering requirements from a number of groups and designing a solution that 
can operate across a wide variety of applications. More than simple aggregation, the 
platform group should be highly technical and capable of designing ahead of where a 
survey of others would place it. This allows for a sufficiently long, scalable lifetime. It 
must also strike a balance between a platform that is too broad a solution (and in so, not 
solving a set of applications closely enough) and a platform that is too narrow (resulting 
in a fragmented, high investment landscape of too many solutions.)  
Beyond technical requirements, the group must also have expertise in determining 
strategic platform options such as the openness of the design. An open platform can lead 
to wider adoption in the marketplace while a closed solution can provide differentiation 
and more control and agility. Open and other multi-participant platforms bring with them 
additional complexity in managing specifications, corporate relationships, etc. At NI, the 
PXI platform is an open standard built on PICMG Compact PCI while the cRIO platform 
is a more closely managed platform which has limited external influence and 
participation. Each of these areas of expertise is unique to a platform group, which is why 
we have created a platform area of focus. 
Endpoint Products: Problem Domain and Solution Domain 
The third area demanding focus to build expertise is each individual product area. 
In many cases, product groups require expertise to not only preserve working knowledge 
of the product itself but also to build a competency in key design skills. The degree of 
divergence within this area should be managed based upon the level of distinct expertise 
needed per product. If two products have nearly identical design constraints despite a 




For example, if a group has a need to design two products (DMM and DSA) 
across two platforms (PXI and cRIO), there are four distinct product needs in total. If the 
relative difference in the core product (DMM and DSA) design constraints is greater than 
the difference in the platform (PXI and cRIO) design constraints, it is more sensible to 
build focus along the product design constraints. In this example, the DMM group would 
build both the cRIO and PXI variants, as would the DSA group. On the other hand, if the 
platform design constraints are greater than the product design constraints, it may be 
preferable to build focus towards each platform. In this case we would have a cRIO group 
and PXI group each of which would build the products needed.  
When determining whether there should be product focus, there are two distinct 
areas that should be considered: the problem domain and the solution domain. The 
examples we have used so far are in the solution domain. It is straightforward to 
understand that organizing for focus allows a group to build the technical expertise 
necessary to build a particular product. But similarly, the group must build expertise in 
the problem domain to understand the “job to be done.” This includes how to 
communicate product attributes effectively (perhaps across different markets) and 
understanding the customer’s alternatives.  
Although the problem and product are related, the particular product is only one 
of many possible solutions. The subtlety is important for two reasons. The first is that the 
organization needs to be able to respond to demand shocks and supply shocks; adapting 
to provide a solution for a customer’s “job to be done.” The problem domain must be 
well understood because it may change based upon influences to the market (demand 
shocks) or the method of solving the problem may change (supply shocks.) The 




perpetuating the previous solution. An organization designed solely around a particular 
solution complicates this shift. 
The second is the organization may need to invest at different levels in the 
problem domain versus the solution domain. As an example, one product development 
group at NI had produced all the modular products deemed necessary for the market. 
Because the Marketing organization is directly coupled to R&D product output, this 
Marketing person was shifted to a different product area. Unfortunately, requests for the 
original product area now have no representative in the organization. This makes it 
difficult to represent the market because the organization was designed around the 
solution domain alone.  
As an example of the first challenge, an organization could build an expertise in 
building and marketing DMMs. This will likely require precisely designed, custom 
analog circuitry to achieve “good” performance of 7 ½ digits of resolution. A demand 
shift example might be the problem domain finding an alternative that provides different 
raw capability but measures the same required phenomenea. In this example, it might be 
measuring system vibration (a DSA application) to monitor machine health instead of a 
previous method that accomplishes the same goal by precisely measuring current usage 
variation (a DMM application). A supply shift example would be a component supplier 
releasing an A/D converter that achieves a similar level of performance but without 
requiring the special expertise originally required. In both cases, direct alignment to the 
expertise needed for the original product is a hindrance in adapting to both the demand 




Market Focus: Segments 
Segments build expertise by specializing in market areas. These market areas 
might be chosen for any number of reasons including their perceived growth potential, 
application fit or to garner market adoption for a discontinuous product. If the marketing 
domain in the product organization represents the problem domain, this segments group 
provides additional focus. By understanding the problem domain and specializing in a 
defined market, the segment creates a closer relationship to these customers and has a 
more honed pulse on a particular market. Because of the strengths required, sales 
expertise is key to this organization in also understanding the purchasing processes and 
politics of a particular market and set of customers. 
CONVERGENCE 
 
Figure 9: Recommended Primary Organizational Structure with Convergence 
The primary structure allows building focus and expertise but it also serves 
another function; the coordinated alignment along the same structural lines. Consider the 
platform branch of the product organization. Each individual platform has characteristics 
that make it unique and require focus. But the set of platforms must be managed and 
controlled. The aggregation of responsibility to the platform group provides this 
alignment. The platform group can manage the set of platforms for the company by 
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knowledgably creating overlap or gaps. Without this convergence, the set of platforms 
would be difficult to manage, platforms would encroach or duplicate efforts and the 
overall platform offering would be non-optimal.  
Similar alignment is needed for I/O coverage in the “Products” branch. This 
group works to determine what I/O is required and develops it based upon the area of 
expertise needed. The convergence allows explicit segmentation of product needs similar 
to the platform group. In the Product Organization itself, alignment provides complete 
visibility into and control of the product needs per platform.  
Within the Segments group, convergence is required for strategic alignment. This 
ensures that a particular market strategy will be reasonably compatible with the other 
market goals and corporate capabilities. It might avoid, for example, Segment A seeking 
to be the low-cost solution and Segment B seeking to be the high performance vendor to 
their respective markets. These divergent strategies would require very different expertise 
and products to be successful. Due to a base of relatively common platforms and core 
competencies, such significantly different directions should be avoided and instead 
aligned unless divergence is absolutely necessary. 
With a focus on gaining significant traction in a defined market with set 
boundaries, it is unlikely each Segment will be successful with the core product portfolio 
and no product adjustments or additions. Instead, the Segments organization can directly 
interface to the Product Organization to request segment-specific products that may not 
otherwise be undertaken as part of the general, broad business.  
SECONDARY STRUCTURE: TECHNOLOGY FOCUS 
This primary structure does not however provide all the support needed. A 




communicated across the organization. A second need is for experts of a particular 
domain to have a communication path across a growing organization. Some key areas of 
expertise that are needed across the organization are Analog, Digital, Mechanical, Bus 
Technologies, Driver Software, Application Software, etc. The Product Organization 
structure’s alignment takes a few of these domain experts and brings them together as a 
product group since most products require multiple domain experts.  
 
Figure 10: Secondary Structure Added to Support Technology Focus 
The secondary structure seeks to support and facilitate this fundamental domain 
expertise. There is a formal ownership for fostering the network itself. This helps ensure 
accountability for preserving the structure. Since it is not the primary organizational 
alignment, it would otherwise fall apart. This group identifies domain experts, 
disseminates knowledge, and manages technologies. Technology management includes 
managing what technologies are tracked and assigning ownership for tracking and 
updating on key technologies as well as monitoring for new technology both close to our 
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domain (for direct application) or more distant technology (for broader technical 
consideration).  
The secondary structure also serves as a network for other areas to find experts to 
support them where they may not have expertise. For example, the Segments are likely to 
have a primary expertise in sales. This structure would make is possible for Segments to 
identify internal domain experts that could provide a more senior perspective in an area 
they might otherwise be forced to interpret from a layman position. This work with the 
Segments would also benefit the technology domain by providing the domain experts 
visibility into other market technologies.  
 “SHIFT” GROUP 
The “Shift” group is a key component of the organization designed to foster the 
paradox of exploiting existing opportunities and exploring to identify new areas of 
growth. “…Conventional wisdom goes wrong…in its assumption that entrepreneurship 
and innovation are natural, creative or spontaneous.” And since “people work within a 
structure”, we must build such a structure to support the entrepreneurial and new. As 
Drucker explains, the impediment to entrepreneurship isn’t the size of the existing 
operation but is the existing successful operation itself.  The exploitation requires 
“constant effort and unremitting attention” which is at the expense of the entrepreneurial 
organization (Drucker, 2001, pp. 137-138). And most organizations “fail to provide the 
formal structure and support that programs need to succeed, such as an autonomous 
organization, processes tailored for highly uncertain work, and well-designed metrics” 
(O’Connor, Corbett, & Pierantozzi, 2009). While not mutually exclusive, the natural 
tendency is for Exploiting and Exploring to not naturally coexist so an organization must 




In addition to identifying opportunities that might be separate from the core 
organization, the Shift group provides a complementary perspective on the core business 
itself. These might be new opportunities for existing products or new product changes 
that may complement or cannibalize the primary organization. The Shift group builds a 
organizational component capable of considering and anticipating disruptive shifts that 
the exploiting part of the business may be too focused to notice. 
Royal Dutch/Shell implemented a similar “GameChanger” process that went live 
in November 1996 to support and fund new ideas from the organization; unfortunately 
very few “revolutionary thoughts” materialized. Shell realized that they needed more than 
just venture funding to build innovation. Instead of simply providing funding, the 
GameChanger team designed a three-day “Innovation Lab” where they were taught how 
to “identify and challenge industry conventions.” At the conclusion, an “Action Lab” 
provided the forum to turn the ideas into credible venture plans including developing 
“low-cost, low-risk ways of testing the ideas.” What Shell realized is that funding wasn’t 
enough; they needed a catalyst to foster and nurture innovation not only through initial 
discovery but also the shaping and reforming of the concept as it grows. (Hamel, 1999) 
Non-Centralized, Support Structure 
The Shift group itself has some similarities to the Distributed Innovation Group 
described in Harvard Business Review’s “Teaming Up to Crack Innovation & Enterprise 
Integration.” The Shift group supports the “Innovation” described as “doing new things 
that customers ultimately appreciate and value [not simply new technologies]” (Cash, 
Earl, & Morison, 2008). The Shift group is not focused on technology alone. It must 
explore both market and technology shocks. Drucker suggests that innovation “be 




knowledge supplies a better core…than technology does” (Drucker, 2001, p. 276). The 
experts who comprise the Shift group must create, in combination, an expertise in 
innovation for both Marketing and Technical vectors. They must be able to take the 
unexpected successes and failures and through market focus, identify whether 
opportunity exists that should be pursued (Drucker, 2001). Figure 11 illustrates the 
Market and Technology distance that the Shift group might explore while the core 
business is engaged in exploitation activities. The vertical axis indicates closeness to the 
core market served and the horizontal axis indicates the technological distance from 
current solutions.  
 
 
Figure 11: Innovation Map Highlighting Market and Technology Trajectories (Smith & 
Tushman, 2005) 
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!Adapted from Tushman and Smith (2002).
products are often in competition with one another for
resources internal to the firm as well as in the mar-
ketplace (Christensen 1997). External demands of the
marketplace and historically rooted inertia reinforce the
existing products over innovation (Hannan and Freeman
1984, Tripsas and Gavetti 2000). If left unconstrained,
these inertial forces trap the organization within its
given competencies (Leonard-Barton 1992, Levitt and
March 1988). Successful incumbents are often caught
by the liabilities of age as exploitation drives out explo-
ration (Kaplan et al. 2003, Benner and Tushman 2002).
Similarly, entrepreneurial firms are often trapped by
their exploratory routines as their contexts shift (Aldrich
1999, Anderson and Tushman 2001).
Ambidextrous designs are organizational forms that
build internally inconsistent architectures and cultures
into business units so that the firm can both explore and
exploit (Adler et al. 1999). These organizational archi-
tectures involve highly differentiated units as well as
top management team integration (He and Wong 2004,
Gibson and Birkinshaw 2004, Tushman and O’Reilly
1997). Where structural differentiation permits firms to
explore as well as exploit, the top management team
serves as the point of integration between these contrast-
ing agendas. It is the top management team that makes
the decisions regarding organizational forms, cultures,
and resource allocation processes, such that their firms
can both explore and exploit (Hambrick 1994, Romanelli
and Tushman 1994). An important function of the senior
team is therefore to create meaning in the context of con-
tradiction and to extract the benefits associated with con-
tradictory strategic agendas (Barnard 1968, Weick 1979,
Thompson 1967).
Top Management Teams, Team Outcomes,
and Barriers to Exploring and Exploiting
Top management teams balance short-term performance
and long-term adaptability through resource alloca-
tion trade-offs and organizational designs decisions
(Edmondson et al. 2003, Eisenhardt and Zbaracki 1992,
Hambrick 1994). These strategic decisions require teams
to negotiate between the existing product and the inno-
vation, identifying outcomes that will ensure the perfor-
mance of both agendas. Borrowing from the negotiation
and conflict management literature, we define balanced
strategic decisions based on two criteria: (1) their dis-
tributive nature, which we define as making balanced
trade-offs over time; and (2) their integrative nature,
which we define as identifying synergies (Bazerman
1998, Lax and Sebenius 1986, Walton and McKersie
1965).
The distributive aspect of a decision involves the divi-
sion of resources between the existing product and the
innovation. Lax and Sebenius (1986) call this “claim-
ing value,” as managers identify resources for each indi-
vidual product. Teams make a number of decisions in
which they might preferentially support either the exist-
ing product or the innovation. These decisions are bal-
anced when, over time, they support both products. For
example, Ciba Vision’s top management team balanced
the ongoing demands of their conventional hard lenses
even as they invested in daily disposables, extended
wear, and Visudyne (Tushman and O’Reilly 1997). In
allocating scarce resources, this senior team worked to
balance the needs of the existing product even as they
worked to develop several possible substitutes.
Decisions can also be defined by their integrative




The Shift group acts as an “active, technology-enabled [agency] to promote 
innovation and integration—to overcome obstacles, focus effort, and let the unnatural 
acts become more natural.” It “recognizes and promotes innovation” to “convert 
corporate scale into an asset rather than a hindrance to innovation initiatives” (Cash, Earl, 
& Morison, 2008). Table 3 illustrates the fundamentals of the Shift group, which were 
adapted from the Distributed Innovation Group concept. 
 
Is Is Not 
A scout for potential ideas within the 
organization—“…uncovering untapped 
potential of latent ideas as well as 
discovering new ones 
A group solely responsible for product and 
technological discovery—Discovery is a 
distributed process 
A monitor of the external environment for 
emerging technologies and their market 
applications 
An isolated group entirely separate from 
the core organization 
A Facilitator for ideation A Diversification method 
A center for innovation expertise including 
Discovery, Incubation and Acceleration.  
 
Table 3: Shift Group Overview; Adapted from Distributed Innovation Group (Cash, Earl, 
& Morison, 2008) 
Symbiotic with Breadth Business 
The Shift group is not a rogue entity entirely separate from the core business. To 
extend the handedness metaphor, the left hand is different from the right but both are still 
connected to the same body and know what each other is doing. The Shift group is 
complementary to the variance-decreasing organization by focusing on variance-
increasing activities. This gives the organization as a whole a better perspective. On the 
subject of creativity, it is suggested: “you want people to work at the ends of the 




the innovation process, when the game has moved from discovery to control and 
reliability” (Amabile & Khaire, 2008). 
But this is not a one-way street. The Shift group is not a completely isolated part 
of the organization since it must stay closely related to the core. “Innovative efforts that 
take the existing business out of its own field are rarely successful.” “The new is always 
sufficiently difficult not to attempt it in an area one does not understand.  An existing 
business innovates where it has expertise…” (Drucker, 2001, p. 142). In this way, the 
sustaining organization and the Shift group provide each other shared capabilities beyond 
their individual area of focus (Raisch & Birkinshaw, 2008). 
Early Market Sampling of Fringe Use Cases  
The broad nature of the sustaining organization provides a key resource to the 
Shift group and is related to early market adoption of broadly applicable products. 
Variable market isolation—described earlier in this paper—assists in the early market 
adopting a technology before they have enough references from the market in which their 
mainstream counterparts might later live. This set of early adopters provides a sample set 
of customers to consider when assessing possible innovation opportunities.  
A second reason this set is such a key resource is because of the breadth and 
modularity of the products involved. Traditional product design creates pointed solutions 
where there is a market large enough to provide some confidence in a reasonable return. 
NI products provide integration across the portfolio of products. This allows for 
significantly greater integration between a wide variety of components than possible with 
traditional solutions. This increases the likelihood of satisfying use cases that span 




Early adopters would otherwise satisfy these problems with custom 
implementations. But particularly with the price insensitive early market, the integration 
between modular offerings makes them a viable alternative that can provide another 
sample of the early market. Figure 12 illustrates the focus of traditional, fixed solutions 
on markets with a large perceived opportunity while modular solutions with horizontal 
integration can instead solve applications that would otherwise be underserved. The x 
axis indicates the set of possible functionality and the y axis illustrates the perceived 
market size of the area. 
 
Figure 12: Modular vs. Traditional Application Coverage 
Stability: A Prerequisite for Risk 
One benefit of a diverse product portfolio described earlier is a stable base. This 


















































Modular: Stronger coupling to other 





factor for successful innovation. Job security allows employees to experiment without 
being concerned with a negative outcome directly affecting their well-being. At a larger 
level, the organization supports exploratory efforts with a stable cash flow, which 
similarly allows experimentation without directly incurring negative repercussions from a 
failed attempt. This low risk support system helps ensure the Shift organization can 
maintain a “risk taking” attitude with experimentation and aggressiveness (Leonard & 
Swap, When Sparks Fly, 2005). 
Shift: Separate Hands 
“This means, first, that the entrepreneurial, the new, has to be organized 
separately from the old and existing.” And “there has to be a special locus for the new 
venture…and it has to be pretty high up.” (Drucker, 2001, pp. 138-139). “Often, the best 
way to achieve true dexterity is to set up separate, autonomous organizations. This has 
the effect of keeping the two hands at, well, arm's length” (Moore, Strategy and Your 
Stronger Hand, 2005). 
Three successful examples Drucker identifies as practitioners of this approach are 
Proctor & Gamble, Johnson & Johnson and 3M. “They set up new ventures as a separate 
business from the beginning and put a project manager in charge…until the project is 
either abandoned or has…become a full-fledged business. The project manager can 
mobilize all the skills as they are needed—research, manufacturing, finance, marketing—
and put them to work on the project team” (Drucker, 2001). Christensen and Raynor’s 
“The Innovator’s Solution” describes key rationale for separating the disruptive from the 
existing business. This is illustrated in Figure 13. Note however that due to the nature of 
NI’s products—they’re used in combination and not separately—our argument is that the 






Figure 13: Christensen and Raynor's Recommended Organizational Structure 
(Christensen & Raynor, 2003, p. 192) 
The measures and processes must be aligned with growing the new business as 
well. Drucker makes a comparison between infants in the nursery and “adults.” Infants 
don’t have the time or understanding to satisfy the requirements asked of adults. The 
motivators built to sustain and optimize the existing business can stifle or derail the new 
enterprise. Drucker identifies a case from a “major chemical company” that completed 
scientific work, which then stagnated. Finally it became clear that new ventures were 
stalling as the primary compensation structure made new ventures highly undesirable, 
even avoidable. Eighteen months after a change to this incentive structure the new 




markets by following the path to “stop listening to its best customers so that it could 
instead pay attention to raw new markets” (Anders, 2007). 
In all, Drucker’s “most important caveat is not to mix managerial units and 
entrepreneurial ones.” As it is “almost a guarantee of failure—for a business to try and 
become entrepreneurial without changing its basic policies and practices. To be an 
entrepreneur on the side rarely works.” (Drucker, 2001, pp. 141-142) 
Separation of the Shift group from the core business allows the organization to 
simultaneously pursue both incremental and discontinuous innovation and change but 
provides each area enough isolation to focus on building expertise for their very different 
goals. The separation of the Shift group also makes possible the extension of the 
ambidexterity concept to “polydexterity which will require firms to coordinate businesses 
that are both complementary and competitive in the current marketplace at the same 
time” (Bodwell & Chermack, 2010, p. 198).  
But Without Walls 
Organizational delineation of the Shift group from the existing business is a 
requirement but it must also be capable of interfacing throughout the company and bridge 
expertise from different domains. “Creativity that will result in useful innovation thrives 
in a partially controlled ecology…” with “ample freedom for ideas to roam” but also 
“boundaries and fences” (Leonard & Swap, When Sparks Fly, 2005). The Shift group 
must have the ability “to ferret out unmet needs” thus working “with fellow explorers 
from other areas of expertise” (Bodwell & Chermack, 2010, p. 196). 
Creative Abrasion 
One key reason for building the Shift organization with focus but without 




“When Sparks Fly” argues that “Aliens” are critical to building what they term creative 
abrasion. They “ask ‘dumb’ (i.e. unexpected) questions” with a “beginner’s mind” which 
cause those deeply familiar with the subject to reassess their preconceptions, leading to 
opportunity for creative insights. A completely homogeneous group is without dissimilar 
views. This should be avoided since dissimilar views are critical to stretch each 
individual’s perspective, which is key to creativity and innovation (Leonard & Swap, 
When Sparks Fly, 2005). 
Aliens should provide a deep knowledge base in a particular area different from 
the perspectives already available. For the Shift group, this perspective might be required 
from various areas of the organization. Bridging experts is desirable versus the alternative 
of working with broad individuals because of the opportunity at the intersection of 
different deep expertise. Those with deep expertise but also capable of bridging to other 
domains are said to have “T-shaped skills” because they can facilitate the intersection 
(the horizontal part of the “T”) of depth (the vertical portion of the “T”) to other domains.  
BRIDGING EXPERTS: CONVERSATIONS FROM AMBIGUOUS TO THE CONCRETE 
As the organization grows, experts of a particular domain must have capability to 
share experience and expertise with others of similar focus. Additionally, convergence of 
experts is central to innovation and creativity (Leonard & Swap, When Sparks Fly, 2005). 
The usual intersection of experts is at a level where each brings to the table what they 
know. Unfortunately, this is ineffective for optimizing the potential breakthroughs when 
connections are made between areas of expertise.  
An example is when a development group attempts to present to and gain insights 
on their product plans from domain experts. With the wide applicability of T&S across 




includes a presentation of the product concepts and plans from one group to the other 
domain experts. Feedback is provided and adjustments are made as necessary. The 
duration of this interaction is rarely more than an hour.  
Unfortunately, this brings significant limitations in gaining feedback useful to 
innovation. Resolution of the time constraint and one-to-many format is reasonably 
straightforward. But the most significant problem is the limited scope each participant is 
considering as part of the discussion. Figure 14 illustrates the dilemma. An expert’s 
knowledge consists of elements with varying levels of confidence. There may be some 
they are absolutely certain of and others that are little more than unlikely possibilities. 
Bridging experts from different domains requires a forum that allows intersection of these 
separate domains. This often requires bringing more to bear than those certainties close to 
the core of their domain expertise.  
Finding intersections requires expanding to include the set of knowledge each 
expert might have less confidence in by building a conversation and environment 
conducive to this task. One method is starting with a very broad conversation to try and 
pull each expert toward each other. By then increasing the level of certainty, the group 
can determine how far the intersection might extend. All intersections, from the 
improbable to the certain should be considered as possible innovation paths to move 
forward. 
T&S Experiment 
The NI Timing and Synchronization (T&S) group performed an exercise on this 
concept by bridging the NI Timing and Synchronization group with domain experts who 
were focused-on and thus well versed in, domain applications of NI technology—




possibilities with access to deep knowledge in the Timing and Synchronization space and 
deep market expertise. The results were significant.  
Most intersections like these are formalized presentations of roadmap plans where 
vetted concepts with an associated timeline are presented to other groups for awareness. 
Unfortunately, these intersections are both too formal and too conservative to generate 
the creative abrasion necessary to make innovative shifts. Instead, it requires a special 
forum with groups who might generate something interesting where they converge.  
 
 
Figure 14: Intersection of Expertise 
By bridging the technology experts with the market experts, new insights can be 
gained. What was most interesting about these discussions was that the insights gained 
would not have been gleaned through any single-direction flow of information, which is 
the usual communication mechanism within the organization. Instead, an iterative, 
continually adjusting conversation is needed to identify small avenues of the conversation 













An example of this led to an insight of applying a new synchronization 
technology to a market that at first glance would have no need for it. The technology 
allows for synchronization at no-cost, across the platforms designed to address the 
market. In the words of the market expert, this market “doesn’t care about 
synchronization.” But during a dedicated session, the team was able to explore with each 
other eventually determining that the new, no-cost technology could be used as a strategic 
differentiator versus the competition. Using the standard, unidirectional communication 
paths, the market experts would never have requested new synchronization technology 
because they expect it will have an associated cost and the Timing and Synchronization 







Figure 15: T-Shaped Bridging to generate Creative Insights 
Build Bridging Expertise 
While Aliens provide the opportunity to benefit from their perspective, they must 
be carefully integrated for interactions with the core team. An example is that aliens 
should be provided their own “Allies” which support the alien viewpoint so it isn’t 
snuffed out by the psychological pressure from the other members of the group. The Shift 
group must be familiar with the psychological tendencies in these interactions and build 
an expertise in managing and fostering these intersections. 
Avoiding Groupthink by Injecting New Blood 
Bringing Aliens into the fold to generate new, larger, creative outlooks is a key 
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that survives. This is where the disruptive challenges creativity demands are not fostered 
but subsumed by the group itself. In fact, over time a group that begins as disruptive can 
become so familiar to each other and so persuaded to maintain relationships that they 
homogenize themselves and become less innovative and creative (Leonard & Swap, 
When Sparks Fly, 2005). But from the broad organization, the Shift group has a pool of 
potential expert Aliens from which to get an injection of disruptive insight. Considering 
this, the size of the Shift group should be dynamic, based on the task at hand, and 
comprised of experts from across the organization arranged to provide not only deep 
expertise but also dissenting—and thus complementary—perspectives.  
Falling Forward 
Exploration brings with it uncertainty which will certainly encounter failures. The 
goal of the Shift group should be to make sure these are intelligent failures—failures that 
were purposeful and taught a lesson in the experience. “Falling forward” allows some 
level of learning that can then be applied elsewhere. This is starkly contrasted with 
useless failures from which the organization does not learn. The Shift group should not 
only be capable of identifying failures and learning lessons to apply in the future but also 
in building the experiments and teams around them so any failures encountered can be 
leveraged moving forward. The group should leverage their awareness for emergent 
opportunity to evaluate each failure for potential in areas outside the original target. With 
a single structure and access to the breadth of markets and products these emergent 
insights have greater opportunity to be directly applicable to another area of the business.  
Key Innovation Phases 
Harvard Business Review’s article “Create Three Distinct Career Paths for 




Acceleration since the phases require distinct expertise and “individuals with [the] 
breadth of skill sets [for every phase] are extremely rare” (O’Connor, Corbett, & 
Pierantozzi, 2009). These three phases with the additional Handoff phase to the 
exploitation part of the organization become key phases for the Shift group to facilitate. 
 
Figure 16: Shift Group Key Phases 
Discovery 
Discovery is the art of “opportunity generation” and using “bench science” to 
assess feasibility. It includes not only technical opportunities but also exploration in the 
market for opportunities as well. While the core organization may use defined processes, 
resource allocation and analysis to identify opportunities, the Shift group specifically 
seeks to identify areas where an “asymmetry of motivation” would make it difficult or 
impossible for the core organization to respond (Christensen & Raynor, 2003).  
Discovery is art. It requires adapting to see a situation from different perspectives 
to add value to the core organization. Both identification and processing of the 
information needed during discovery is challenged. “End-user intelligence that comes 
back can be a lot hazier and harder to sort out than a nice two-hour PowerPoint 








potentially-valuable information and process the information once it is gathered (Anders, 
2007). 
Traditional organizations like Bell Labs created dedicated research wings to 
support exploratory work. Unfortunately, this makes it difficult to foster the intersections 
of experts that are so valuable for innovation. It also limits the set of individuals who 
generate sparks of insight to a select few who would likely tend to homogenize over time, 
thus reducing their creativity. Instead significant research is pointing towards bottom-up 
discovery as preferable to the dedicated wing approach. “Top-down knowledge inflows 
from persons at higher hierarchical levels than the manager are positively related to 
exploitation. Conversely, horizontal and bottom-up knowledge inflows from peers and 
persons at lower hierarchical levels are positively related to exploration” (Raisch & 
Birkinshaw, 2008). 
The argument against top-down or isolated innovators is significant. “First, where 
in the pyramid will you find the least genetic diversity in terms of how people think about 
the business? Second, where in the organization will you find people who have most of 
their emotional equity invested in the past? And third, where will you find people who 
have, for the most part, already ‘made it’?” (Hamel, 1999). Similarly, from an “analysis 
of innovations at Google: its founders tracked the progress of ideas that they had backed 
versus ideas that had been executed in the ranks without support from above, and 
discovered a higher success rate in the latter category” (Amabile & Khaire, 2008).  
Instead the goal should be to facilitate idea generation from those throughout the 
organization. This includes encouraging cross-pollination across non-standard lines to 
generate creative abrasion. The Shift group can connect experts who wouldn’t normally 
intersect in the standard business but whose intersection provides unique opportunities 




including variation of ideas—from across the organization. This is an example of 
applying selection and focus while embracing broad sources of variation and innovation. 
The Discovery phase supports this concept. 
Thus the Shift group has a responsibility to the Discovery phase of Innovation but 
it does not pursue it in isolation. Instead, it seeks to catalyze the rest of the organization 
supporting a bottom-up innovation structure and to “tap ideas from all ranks” (Amabile & 
Khaire, 2008). Instead of attempting to be the sole source of ideas, the Shift group 
supports and facilitates idea generation from any area within the company through its 
focused expertise in discovery itself.  
Incubation 
Incubation is the experimentation and iteration with technology and business 
concepts in an attempt to design a viable model for a new business. It is deeply rooted in 
exploration and emergent strategy with an understanding that adjustments must be made 
based upon technological or market feedback. “Most successful entrepreneurs understand 
that they need to ‘pivot’ as they get additional data and learning.” This is what Cagan 
terms “Product Discovery;” iterating to determine what the product should be (Cagan, 
2009). This “pivot” is a shift from the direction originally intended to better serve given 
the new knowledge the iterating provided. Incubation supports this understanding that 
entrepreneurial and exploratory areas need to be open to discovering what product they 
have opportunity to exploit. 
During this stage, optimizing iterative learning is key. The existing, standard 
learning cycle for a product is illustrated in Figure 17. It consists of the R&D 
organization that designs and develops products. These are then transferred through the 




of a project kickoff is not illustrated. It is assumed that for a disruptive technology, this 
internal-only vantage point provides limited learning opportunity versus the customers 
themselves.  
 
Figure 17: Standard Iterative Learning Cycle 
Unfortunately, not only is this process expensive in both time and resource cost, 
but the path for iterating is highly imperfect. The channel is lossy with thousands of 
products to communicate; the engagement to the right end customers is prioritized not on 
usefulness of feedback but possible sales revenue; and in the event of no sale, there is no 















significant that it demanded direct engagement. The Shift group’s incubation stage seeks 
to create expertise in building low-cost, rapid, and valuable iterative feedback to adjust 
the innovation and move forward. It must decrease the iteration time to build agility into 
the process. 
This requires an expertise in selecting the right customers to provide feedback. 
Often these customers are not at the core of the market that the organization intends to 
address. Instead, extreme examples at the edge of the distribution often exhibit the same 
characteristics as those in the valuable core but in more identifiable proportions which are 
thus more valuable for iterative learning (Patton, 2010).  
This includes a need to correct any channel bias that might undermine connecting 
to the right customers. If the existing channel is used, it must be monitored for bias 
towards the incentive structure in place. For steady-state business, this optimization 
towards the most profitable customers is appropriate but for exploration, it may be the 
opposite of what is needed. The new channel may not be appropriate for these “right” 
customers either. New customers often purchase from a new channel. And disruptive 
products often require disruptive channels to be effective (Christensen & Raynor, 2003). 
It also requires an expertise in the design of the product to be iterated against. The 
first distinction is one of Engineering; that the product for rapid iteration should not be 
the same product intended to satisfy a large customer base or become a technology 
platform for the next generation of products. The form most suited for this product is 
often a prototype. But while a standard development process may create a prototype 
which seeks to mitigate risk, appease differing views and be a step towards the eventual 
(likely conservative) product, a prototype in the incubation stage should be designed 
explicitly to test boundaries, stretch possibilities and instead see where the possible 




The “agility approach is suitable for projects with high levels of uncertainty and 
risk and frequently changing environments. A stability approach is appropriate for 
projects in which ‘the requirements are stable and predictable, and when the project is 
large, critical, and complex’” (Bodwell & Chermack, 2010). The explicit distinction 
between the goals of the agile versus the stable development processes helps keep the 
incubation stage prototyping separate and with a distinct focus. This allows better 
management of the uncertainty and risk through which incubation must learn by keeping 
it lightweight, focused and low risk/cost. 
Acceleration 
Acceleration is the stage focused on building the business to the point that it can 
stand on its own. This includes optimizing and building processes, imposing discipline 
and repeatability. It is the stage at which the organization shifts from exploration towards 
exploitation, honing processes to ensure the business can be supported and perpetuated. 
Moore’s “Inside the Tornado” describes the rapid acceleration some products experience 
after the Chasm. Key competencies needed for this stage include managing and coping 
with this rapid adoption for an early business (Moore, Inside The Tornado, 1999). 
Handoff: A Well-Oiled Machine 
The Shift group’s work is not simply building options for opportunities. It must 
work on building opportunities to the point that they can be managed by the Product area 
of the organization that is more adept at general product line management. “Research on 
dynamic managerial capabilities and organizational change has focused on how leaders 
can successfully innovate to enable adaptation…This focus on adaptation may lead to 
suboptimal performance. Instead, we argue that sustained performance occurs through 




term adaptability, exploration and exploitation, focus and flexibility” (Smith & Tushman, 
2005). The handoff phase is not necessarily a discrete step. It must be an endpoint that the 
Shift group consistently works towards alongside the primary Product organization as the 
product develops and matures. This way both parties are invested and prepared as the 
innovation matures towards Handoff. 
Shift to Complement Existing Focus 
The Shift group is not limited to entirely new domains. Even in areas where a 
formal structure—such as a Segment—supports a particular market, a Shift perspective is 
needed. This is simply because of the different motivations driving the Segment 
organization versus the Shift organization. Segments are primarily a sales focus with key 
performance metrics of market share and growth of sales. These are reasonable measures 
since the market is well defined and penetration is the primary objective. This resulting 
focus supports the greatest areas for profitability in a traditional ROI-maximization 
methodology.  
Unfortunately, this focus may have significant drawbacks when it comes to 
identifying changes that might necessitate focus for larger market gains in the long term. 
This is where the Shift group can provide a complementary focus towards the leading end 
of the curve with a focus on changes in the market due to demand or supply shocks. 
Figure 18 illustrates Moore’s adoption lifecycle and the two primary areas the Shift group 
creates value. The first (leftmost) is the identification and incubation of new areas of 
opportunity, adjusting with the emergent strategy that unfolds and might be handed off to 
become a part of the business long term. The second is the awareness of changes to the 
market while the primary organization focuses on maintaining the business for the 




Figure 19 illustrates the areas of the market the sales-focused organization 
chooses to optimize based upon larger immediate revenue potential. In contrast, a 
strategy of monitoring and leading the early market might lead to a larger long-term 
market share. Neither perspective is individually sustainable. But in balance, these two 
areas working together should mitigate the Innovator’s Dilemma.  
 
Figure 18: Illustration of the Shift Group's Primary Market Effects 
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Key Distinctions From the Current Structure 
The complete recommended organizational structure is illustrated in Figure 20. 
For comparison, a simplified version of the current NI organizational structure is 
provided in Figure 21. Key distinctions are captured and discussed.  
 
Figure 20: Recommended Organizational Structure 
 
Figure 21: Simplified Current NI Organizational Structure 
The first notable difference is that Engineering Marketing and R&D are not part 
of the same organization. This limits the scope of product decisions that can be made 
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since an increase in Engineering development investment does not necessarily bring with 
it an increase in Marketing investment and vice versa. Additionally, the focus of the 
Marketing area on the problem domain and the R&D on the solution domain is not 
maintained in the current model. 
Secondly, platforms aren’t aligned under a particular organization. While experts 
in platform development are coordinated when the consideration of a new platform or 
change to platform is forced, alignment is not naturally maintained by the structure and 
platform overlap or gaps are more possible.  
Four Vice Presidents manage the R&D area. The delineation of products has the 
same challenges as previously described—customers use products from across these 
“product” boundaries to build their system. While a relatively flat structure, this 
separation of product functions limits visibility across areas.  
The only Segment alignment is to the VP of Sales directly. This creates limited 
bandwidth for aligning the five segments that exist currently and may become more 
difficult as the number of segments grows.  
There is no formal secondary network to support technical cross-pollination. The 
network of technical experts with similar focus exists but is not well defined and perhaps 
more importantly, is not bridged as a resource to other parts of the organization. This 
serves to limit how much cross-pollination can be accomplished and whether parts of the 
organization such as the Segments can leverage this expertise.  
Discovery, Incubation, Acceleration is not supported by an explicit organizational 
structure. Forums such as “NI Tech” (a three day technology forum) and the culture of 
the organization deeply embed value for innovation but are likely far less effective and 
sustainable than if an organization like the Shift group were in place. Because of this lack 




the primary structure and its focus on deliberate, variance-decreasing activities would 
serve to undermine work towards innovation. Additionally, innovation is difficult to 
accomplish since it likely requires mobilizing areas across the organization, which an 
individual wouldn’t have access to or control over.  
Lastly, since there is no group to monitor technology explicitly, this task is 
replicated across various parts of the organization. Similar to many of the other design 
challenges with the current structure, this causes inefficiency through rework and 
potential gaps where it is unclear if a technology is being or should be monitored.  
Conclusions 
There are distinct management difficulties for a modular organization serving (1) 
a broad set of customers (2) with a product that requires them to change behavior that (3) 
leverages high technology products. The natural evolution of a business seeks to optimize 
behaviors to reduce variability through processes. This exploitative focus builds inertia 
and with it an inability to react to discontinuous shifts. Breadth brings with it distinct 
advantages that we seek to maintain as a business but must coexist with focus on key 
challenges of discontinuous product adoption. 
The suggested organizational structure seeks to mitigate these challenges by 
building ambidexterity into the organization. This “Genius of the And” approach seeks to 
manage the inherent paradoxes of: breadth and focus, sustaining and disruptive 
innovation, deliberate and emergent strategy, exploitation and exploration, and structure 
with adaptability. These seemingly contradictory perspectives challenge and support each 
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